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Jonathan Sero,     Case No. 20178791-SC 
 
Respondent/Appellee  





         This case turns on the great import of protecting and preserving the best interests 
of children. There are two questions for this Court to determine: (1) the extent to which a 
parent’s right to travel should influence a custody determination, and (2) the extent to 
which one parent may avoid paying a share of childcare expenses by asserting an 
equitable defense of laches. Though both questions implicate the rights and interests of 
the parents, this Court’s holding should come down to the best interests of the children. 
The case arises from the parties’ performance under a divorce decree and a recent 
attempt to modify that divorce decree. Nancy Felix and Jonathan Sero divorced in 2005. 
The initial divorce decree granted Mr. Sero sole physical custody of the parties’ two 
children, ages one and three at the time. Shortly after the divorce, Ms. Felix began 
pursuing a Ph.D. in chemical engineering. In the years that followed, Mr. Sero served 
admirably as the children’s primary caregiver and Ms. Felix made the most of her time 
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with the children while she continued to invest in their future by securing excellent 
childcare and education for the children and by pursuing an advanced degree that would 
create vast opportunities for the children. 
 Ms. Felix earned her Ph.D. in 2015 and subsequently secured an employment 
package that promised invaluable educational and experiential opportunities for the 
children. Because the position required Ms. Felix to relocate to South Carolina, Ms. Felix 
sought to modify the divorce decree to enable her and the children to pursue their new 
opportunities in South Carolina. Ms. Felix also sought reimbursement for Mr. Sero’s 
unpaid share of the childcare expenses. 
 The district court did modify the divorce decree because it determined that the 
children’s best interests would be served by pursuing the opportunities available to them 
in South Carolina. However, the court offered to maintain the existing custody 
arrangement if Mr. Sero would move with the children to South Carolina. Mr. Sero 
argued that the court had violated his constitutionally protected right to interstate travel, 
and the court of appeals agreed. But the panel erred when it held that a custody 
determination must weigh the competing constitutional rights of the parents, rather than 
prioritizing the best interests of the children.  
Regarding the unpaid childcare expenses, the district court concluded that Ms. 
Felix’s claim was within the applicable statute of limitation, but that it was barred by the 
equitable defense of laches. The court of appeals reluctantly agreed, signaling its belief 
that the controlling line of cases had been wrongly decided.  
  2470 
 3 
This Court should hold that a custody determination should be based on an 
“objective and impartial” determination of the best interests of the children, and that it 
likewise serves the best interests of the children to prohibit an equitable defense of laches 
against unpaid childcare expenses when the claim is brought within the applicable statute 
of limitation. Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989) (providing that a 
determination of custody based on the child's best interests is based on an objective and 
impartial comparison of the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents).  
JURISDICTION 
  
         This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(a). This Court also 
has jurisdiction under the Utah Child Support Act under Utah Code § 78B-12-110 
(“Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under this chapter as in other civil 
actions.”). 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that a custody determination must 
balance the parents’ competing constitutional rights to interstate travel, rather than 
prioritizing the best interests of the children. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews de novo a question of whether the district 
court applied the correct legal standard. This case raises the question of whether a 
unique legal standard applies to custody determinations that may infringe a 
parent’s constitutional right to interstate travel and is reviewed de novo, without 
deference to the court of appeals. Mawhinney v. City of Draper, 2014 UT 54, ¶ 6, 
342 P.3d 262. 
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Preservation: The panel addressed issue 1 at Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, 
¶¶  31–42, ---P.3d---. Issue 1 was presented in the questions for certiorari. See 
Addenda A; Addenda B. 
Issue 2: Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that a party may assert laches to 
bar a claim for unpaid childcare expenses when the statute of limitations has not yet 
barred the claim and the Legislature has acted to bar similar claims for waiver and 
estoppel. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness. Whether laches is available when the applicable statute of limitations 
has not expired is a legal question and is reviewed for correctness. Veysey v. 
Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14, 397 P.3d 846; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ¶ 4, 979 
P.2d 823. 
 Preservation: The panel addressed issue 2 at Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, 
¶¶  43–50, ---P.3d---. Issue 2 was presented in the questions for certiorari. See 
Addenda A; Addenda B. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
“In determining any form of custody, including a change in custody, the court 
shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a).   
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 This case arises from a divorce decree between Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero granting 
Mr. Sero sole physical custody of the parties’ two children. (R. ¶ 4). Mr. Sero went above 
and beyond in providing excellent care for his and Ms. Felix’s two children for the years 
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following Mr. Sero and Ms. Felix’s divorce. (R. ¶ 4). However, ten years after the 
divorce, Ms. Felix has become a well-respected chemical engineer with a very lucrative 
and flexible job offer in South Carolina. (R. ¶ 16). Ms. Felix’s professional opportunity 
will enable her to provide for the children in ways that Mr. Sero cannot. (R. ¶ 19). 
Specifically, Ms. Felix’s job offer will enable her to spend more time with her children 
while providing financial security, access to unrivaled education, and opportunities to 
study abroad. (R. ¶ 19). However, Ms. Felix must move to South Carolina to take 
advantage of the offer. (R. ¶ 19).   
Mr. Sero is aware that allowing the children to relocate to South Carolina with Ms. 
Felix will be extremely beneficial for the children: “I understand that this means she’ll 
expose our kids to opportunities that I could never give them. Even if the money wasn’t 
an issue, it’s a fact of my life that I’m not going to be able to spend weeks at a time with 
my kids or put them in private schools . . . or send them to Europe in the summer.” 
(R. ¶ 19). Still, Mr. Sero opposes a modified custody determination that will allow the 
children to take advantage of those benefits. (R. ¶ 21). Mr. Sero even opposes a custody 
determination that will allow him to remain the primary custodian because he is 
unwilling to relocate to South Carolina. (R. ¶ 21). 
The Initial Divorce Decree 
         Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero divorced ten years prior to 2015, the year of the original 
district court action. (R. ¶ 4). Under the initial divorce decree, Mr. Sero was awarded sole 
physical custody of his and Ms. Felix’s children. (R. ¶ 4).  In the time since the divorce, 
Ms. Felix began investing in the children’s future by pursuing a Ph.D. in chemical 
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engineering. (R. ¶ 10; ¶ 12). This meant that Ms. Felix had less flexibility and less time to 
spend with her children, though Ms. Felix has borne “the lion’s share of costs associated 
with child care expenses.” (R. ¶ 3; ¶ 12). 
Additionally, though she had less time to devote to childcare, the court below 
found that “Ms. Felix’s parenting was ‘outstanding,’ specifically saying that ‘parents who 
juggle relationships with their children while pursuing advanced degrees have a uniquely 
difficult task in weighing the benefits of being present for day-to-day support against the 
value of laying the groundwork for a better future.’” (R. ¶ 12). The court went on to find 
that “Ms. Felix exercised good judgment in making those decisions and, despite how 
difficult it must have been, gave her children a level of attentiveness and support on par 
with a parent with fewer obligations or ambitions.” (R. ¶ 12). 
Unpaid Childcare Expenses 
After the divorce, Ms. Felix acted to ensure the children had professional childcare 
while Ms. Felix was at school or Mr. Sero was at work. (R. ¶ 14). Ms. Felix enrolled the 
children in a well-reputed childcare center. (R. ¶ 14). Compared to the children’s 
childcare center before the divorce, this childcare center provided a much higher quality 
of care, with a more “robust curriculum, smaller classroom sizes . . . and generally had a 
better reputation for providing quality childcare.” (R. ¶ 14). Mr. Sero liked the new 
facility because of the higher quality of care and because it was closer to his home, 
making it easier to pick up and drop off the children. (R. ¶ 14).  
The facility cost $400 per month more than the previous daycare facility. 
(R. ¶ 14). As the parties had agreed, Ms. Felix paid the childcare center and sought 
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reimbursement for a share of the expense from Mr. Sero. (R. ¶ 15). Ms. Felix provided 
written verification to Mr. Sero of the increased rates and asked Mr. Sero to pay his share 
but Mr. Sero never did. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero testified that he was aware of the obligation 
but that he did not think it applied. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero believed that, because Ms. Felix 
made the change without telling him first, he did not have to pay his share of the 
childcare expenses when Ms. Felix asked for reimbursement. (R. ¶ 15). Mr. Sero never 
paid his share of the childcare expenses, and the outstanding amount is now nearly 
$24,000 accumulated over the ten years since the divorce. (R. ¶ 26). Ms. Felix did not 
pursue the issue further after Mr. Sero did not pay his share of the expenses. (R. ¶ 15). 
Mr. Sero argued in the district court that if Ms. Felix had brought up the issue, then Mr. 
Sero could have challenged the obligation in court. (R. ¶ 26). Mr. Sero based this 
argument on his view that he was not required to pay because Ms. Felix did not tell him 
about the increased expenses before switching childcare facilities (R. ¶ 16). 
Mr. Sero’s Time as Caregiver 
 Following the divorce, Mr. Sero had primary custody of the children. (R. ¶ 5). The 
parties “very amicably and conscientiously handled Ms. Felix’s visitation of her 
children,” and adhered to “mutually acceptable” parenting plans throughout Mr. Sero’s 
time as caregiver. (R. ¶ 5). Mr. Sero, in his capacity as sole physical custodian of the 
children, handled the greater share of the parenting responsibilities, and handled those 
responsibilities well. (R. ¶ 6). 
 Mr. Sero consistently puts the needs of his children before his own. (R. ¶ 6). For 
example, when Mr. Sero’s brother won an all-expenses-paid trip to Bavaria and asked 
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Mr. Sero to join him, Mr. Sero arranged to have the children stay with his parents for the 
duration of the trip. (R. ¶ 7) However, upon further thought, Mr. Sero declined once it 
became clear that the trip was in conflict with his and Ms. Felix’s daughter’s ballet recital 
and their son’s little league playoffs. (R. ¶ 7). On the second occasion, Mr. Sero’s 
daughter was sick, and required several days of home care. (R. ¶ 8). Mr. Sero stayed 
home from work to provide that care, even though his employment did not provide for 
sick leave to cover the extended absence. (R. ¶ 8). The district court noted that such a 
sacrifice is “central to sound parenting.” (R. ¶ 8). 
 Based on these examples and other accounts of Mr. Sero’s sound parenting, the 
custody evaluator concluded that “Mr. Sero provided a ‘stable, supportive, and positive 
growth environment for the children” and had balanced his career, childcare, and 
maintaining a positive relationship with an ex-spouse very well. (R. ¶ 9). 
Ms. Felix’s Justification for Moving the Children 
 Shortly after Ms. Felix published her graduate thesis, her investment in her 
children’s future paid off (R. ¶ 10; ¶ 13). On the strength of Ms. Felix’s technological 
breakthroughs in the field of chemical engineering, Ms. Felix was courted by several 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. (R. ¶ 13). Ms. Felix was offered high-level positions at 
any of the largest and most powerful pharmaceutical companies in the United States. 
(R. ¶ 16). 
Though all of the offers would require Ms. Felix to relocate to the east coast, the 
offers would all provide significant financial freedom. (R. ¶ 16). Beyond financial 
freedom, Ms. Felix also negotiated a unique “quality of life” package with a South 
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Carolina company in order to “make up for lost time” with her children. (R. ¶ 17). The 
package entitles her to six two-week vacations per year to spend with her children. 
(R. ¶ 17). When she is not on leave, Ms. Felix will not be required to work more than 40 
hours per week. (R. ¶ 17). This employment package also includes a “generous policy for 
sick-leave (above and beyond the scheduled leave)” in case health problems arise again 
for the children. (R. ¶ 17). The company also agreed to cover the costs of tuition and 
extracurricular activities at any of several private schools identified by the company 
(R. ¶ 17). Additionally, the company would provide free enrollment for the children to 
two different study abroad opportunities in Europe during summers while they are in high 
school. (R. ¶ 17). 
The district court gave no meaningful weight to Ms. Felix’s compensation 
structure because, even if Mr. Sero maintained sole custody, the new wealth that Ms. 
Felix had worked to acquire would be redistributed to Mr. Sero under the terms of the 
divorce decree.  (R. ¶ 19). However, the court’s custody evaluator testified that the 
proposed structure was “perhaps the best conceivable approach to childhood development 
for teenagers.” (R. ¶ 19). The custody evaluator testified that: “Putting teens in good 
schools positions them for future success. Participating in varied extra-curricular 
activities not only contributes to their happiness and growth, but also sets them up to 
succeed outside of a classroom. The study abroad experiences raise cultural awareness 
and instill in teenagers a sense of their role in the world . . . .” (R. ¶ 19). The custody 
evaluator also concluded that Ms. Felix’s frequent and extended vacations are “likely to 
foster positive bonding” and that “there is no better recipe for a positive relationship.” To 
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take advantage of these vast benefits, Ms. Felix and the children must move to South 
Carolina. (R. ¶ 18). 
The Court’s Attempts to Compromise with Mr. Sero 
 Mr. Sero is aware of the benefits his children stand to reap from the opportunities 
Ms. Felix can now provide. (R. ¶ 19). Likewise, the court could not ignore the benefits 
that the children would enjoy from Ms. Felix’s employment, and the court was persuaded 
by the equity of giving Ms. Felix the opportunity to build the kind of relationship with the 
children that Mr. Sero had built over the last ten years. (R. ¶ 20). Still, the court offered to 
allow Mr. Sero to retain primary custody if Mr. Sero would move to South Carolina with 
his children and Ms. Felix. (R. ¶ 21). Mr. Sero refused, maintaining that there “is just no 
way I can leave my job, my family, my home, my friends, and the life I have built in 
Utah.” (R. ¶ 21).  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 This case stems from divorce proceedings between Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero in 
2005. (R. ¶ 1). In the initial divorce decree, Mr. Sero was awarded sole physical custody 
of their two children. (R. ¶ 1). Mr. Sero retained sole physical custody for ten years 
following the divorce. (R. ¶ 4). In early 2015, Ms. Felix earned a Ph.D. in chemical 
engineering and subsequently negotiated a lucrative and flexible employment package 
with a company in South Carolina. (R. ¶ 16; ¶ 17). Ms. Felix now seeks to modify the 
divorce decree. (R. ¶ 4). Ms. Felix brought this action in the district court and sought 
modification of the divorce decree to allow her to move with her children to South 
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Carolina to take advantage of the many benefits provided by her new professional 
opportunity. (R. ¶ 22).  
 At trial, Ms. Felix argued a number of issues but sought two main remedies. 
(R. ¶ 1). First, Ms. Felix sought sole custody of her children, in order to move with them 
to South Carolina. (R. ¶ 2); and second, Ms. Felix brought a claim for Mr. Sero’s unpaid 
share of childcare expenses (R. ¶ 15). The district court agreed with Ms. Felix that it was 
in the best interests of the children to move with their mother to South Carolina. 
(R. ¶ 20). The court offered Mr. Sero a compromise offer, wherein he would retain sole 
physical custody if he would move to South Carolina with Ms. Felix and the children. 
(R. ¶ 20). Mr. Sero declined, citing his constitutional right to travel in order to stay in 
Utah. (R. ¶ 22). Additionally, Mr. Sero asserted laches to bar Ms. Felix’s recovery of the 
unpaid childcare expenses, due to Ms. Felix’s ten-year delay in bringing the claim 
(R. ¶ 26). On the issue of custody, the district court found that it would serve the 
children’s best interests to pursue the opportunities in South Carolina and awarded sole 
physical custody to Ms. Felix. (R. ¶ 25). On the issue of laches, the district court held that 
the laches was available to bar Ms. Felix’s claim for unpaid childcare expenses. (R. ¶ 27).  
 Both parties appealed the district court’s decision. (R. ¶ 28). The court of appeals 
reversed the district court’s award of sole custody to Ms. Felix on the grounds that the 
district court did not give due consideration to Mr. Sero’s constitutional right to travel. 
(R. ¶ 28). On the laches issue, the court of appeals “reluctantly affirm[ed]” based on 
horizontal stare decisis supporting the use of laches to cut short the statute of limitations. 
(R. ¶ 28).  
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 In this Court, the parties present the same two issues: First, whether a custody 
determination must balance the parents’ competing constitutional rights to travel, rather 
than being based solely on the best interests of the children, and second, whether the 
defense of laches is available when the Legislature has acted to create a statute of 
limitations. See Addendum A.   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 For the reasons that follow, Petitioner is requesting that the Court rule on two 
issues: (I) whether a custody determination must balance the parents’ competing rights to 
interstate travel rather than being based solely on the best interests of the children, and 
(II) whether a parent can assert laches to avoid paying outstanding childcare expenses 
when the applicable statute of limitations has not yet barred the claim. Both of these 
issues turn on the weight given to the best interests of children in divorce proceedings.  
First, a parent’s right to travel should not outweigh the best interests of the 
children.  The Utah Legislature directs, “In determining any form of custody, including a 
change in custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH 
CODE § 30-3-10(a). The best-interests approach, which “has long been the bellwether 
indicator of custody determinations,” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. 
dissenting part and concurring in part), is constitutionally sound and produces desirable 
results. 
Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, as established by the United 
States Constitution. Because the right to travel is fundamental, any infringement on that 
right is subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, when a custody determination infringes a parent’s 
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fundamental right to interstate travel, it will only survive strict scrutiny if it is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  
 States have a “duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children.” 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). When a custody determination is narrowly 
tailored to “protect the interests of [the] children,” it is constitutionally sound despite any 
infringement on the parents’ respective rights to interstate travel. Id.  
 In addition to following from precedent, the best-interests approach also produces 
desirable results. A custody determination that is grounded on the best interests of the 
children avoids harm to parents because it does not attempt to determine whether one 
parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel is weightier than another parent’s 
fundamental right to interstate travel. Moreover, the best-interests approach avoids harm 
to children because it does not yield an outcome that differs from a court’s objective 
determination of the custody arrangement that would best serve the interests of the 
children. 
Turning to the claims for unpaid childcare expenses, Mr. Sero should not be 
permitted to use the doctrine of laches to cut short the statute of limitations for two main 
reasons: First, the court’s bar on defenses of waiver and estoppel should be read to 
include a bar on laches; and second, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations 
violates separation of powers principles. 
First, when the Legislature barred claims for waiver and estoppel in certain actions 
for unpaid child support, the use of the terms “waiver and estoppel” created ambiguity. It 
is well understood that the doctrine of laches “may operate as an estoppel against the 
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assertion of a right.” 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:11 (4th ed.). Given the close link in 
Utah case law between doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel, and the functional 
similarity of the two doctrines, it is unclear whether the court meant to bar claims for 
estoppel specifically, or all claims that operate as an estoppel.  The court may resolve this 
ambiguity by looking to the absurd consequences canon, which encourages courts to 
adopt a reading that does not render a term of the statute a nullity. Reading the 
Legislature’s bar on waiver and estoppel to allow laches creates a way to sidestep the bar 
on estoppel by asserting laches instead. In practice, this result nullifies the bar on 
estoppel. Therefore, the court should read the bar on estoppel to include a bar on laches.  
Second, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations violates separation of 
powers principles. Utah courts have refused to give up their equitable powers absent a 
clear command from the Legislature. By barring defenses of waiver and estoppel, the 
Legislature issued a clear command to the courts to give up their equitable powers.  
While Utah courts have abandoned the distinction between law and equity, when 
the Legislature has acted, a court still may only exercise their equitable powers when it is 
necessary to prevent injustice. Allowing laches is not necessary to prevent injustice here. 
.Mr. Sero owes Ms. Felix $24,000 in unpaid childcare expenses; those expenses are his 
responsibility and the funds would have been used for the benefit of the children. Using 
laches to punish Ms. Felix and vindicate Mr. Sero results primarily in reduced financial 
resources for children.  
Moreover, the Legislature is in the best position to make broad determinations of 
the amount of time parents have to bring claims for unpaid child support. Allowing 
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laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates an imperative for ex-spouses to enter 
quick litigation, rather than trying to settle the problems themselves or waiting until after 
their children reach majority to sue one another. Forcing ex-spouses to litigate quickly or 
lose their claims ultimately results in familial strain injustice to the children.   
ARGUMENT 
 
I.   A CUSTODY DETERMINATION IS PROPERLY BASED ON THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE THE BEST-INTERESTS APPROACH IS 
HARMONIOUS WITH COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND 
AVOIDS HARM TO PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 
  
A custody determination should be based on the best interests of the children in 
accordance with section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code, which provides: “In determining any 
form of custody, including a change in custody, the court shall consider the best interests 
of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a). This approach is harmonious with 
competing constitutional concerns and avoids harm to both parents and children. 
The United States Constitution protects a fundamental right to travel. Saenz v. 
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). This Court has recognized that a right is fundamental 
when it “form[s] an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society . . . .” Utah 
Public Emp. Ass’n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). The right to interstate 
travel is one such fundamental right. Id. When this Court “has recognized a . . . right it 
deems ‘fundamental,’ it has consistently applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the 
protection of such a right.” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26, 359 P.3d 603. 
Under strict scrutiny, a state may not “infring[e] fundamental liberty interests, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003). To be sure, the “State has an urgent 
interest in the welfare of the child . . . .” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham 
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). Thus, a custody determination that infringes the 
parents’ competing rights to interstate travel will survive when the determination is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. 
The best-interests approach is not only constitutionally sound, it also produces 
desirable outcomes because it avoids harm to parents and children. The best-interests 
approach avoids a determination that one parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel is 
weightier than another parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel and it avoids an 
outcome that undermines the best interests of the children. 
This Court should hold that a custody determination is properly based on the best 
interests of the children because (A) the best-interests approach is harmonious with 
competing constitutional concerns that arise from the parents’ respective rights to 
interstate travel and (B) the best-interests approach avoids harm to both parents and 
children. 
A. The Best-Interests Approach is Harmonious with Competing 
Constitutional Concerns Because Parents Enjoy a Fundamental Right 
to Travel that Warrants Strict Scrutiny and States Have a Compelling 
Interest in Protecting the Welfare of Children. 
  
A custody determination is harmonious with the competing constitutional 
concerns of the parents when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the 
children. Implicit in such a custody determination is a recognition that (1) parents enjoy a 
fundamental right to interstate travel, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999), and (2) a 
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custody determination may only infringe those rights if it is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the best interests of the children, Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603. 
1. Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel and any infringement 
on that right warrants strict scrutiny. 
  
Parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, as established by the United 
States Constitution, and that right may only be infringed by a custody determination if the 
determination survives strict scrutiny. 
The court of appeals correctly found that the United States Constitution protects a 
fundamental right to travel that includes the right to choose one’s state of residence. Felix 
v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31,---P.3d---. The court recognized that the right is both 
“firmly embedded in [constitutional] jurisprudence,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 
(1999), and “notoriously difficult to pin down.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31. 
The court traced the right’s possible origins from the privileges and immunities clause, 
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–02, the due process clause, Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418–19 
n.13 (1981), or the commerce clause, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758–59 
(1966). Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 31. Regardless of its origins, “[a]ll have 
agreed that the right exists.” Guest, 383 U.S. at 759. 
In the context of custody determinations, a parent’s right to interstate travel is 
intertwined with a fundamental right to the “companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her children.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has proclaimed that the rights to conceive and raise one’s children are 
“essential,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and “basic civil rights,” 
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Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In every custody determination, the 
parental rights at stake are numerous and weighty. 
The deprivation of such rights in a custody determination is subject to strict 
scrutiny. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).  Under this 
exacting standard, “a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in 
which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a ‘compelling 
governmental interest.’” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603 (citing 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). This is, in effect, the standard that 
Utah courts have historically applied in custody determinations. See Felix v. Sero, 2017 
UT App 723, ¶ 54 (Zane, J. dissenting part and concurring in part) (“I believe that rule is, 
in effect, the rule applied by the district court in this case . . . .”). 
The Utah Supreme Court has already contemplated the possibility of a new, 
intermediate standard in the context of child custody and visitation rights. Jones v. Jones, 
2015 UT 84, ¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603. But the court noted that “the enterprise . . . of 
abandoning the usual standard for a lesser one that balances the relevant interests in a 
new way—is an uncomfortable venture for a lower court. Such a venture seems more an 
act of policymaking than of application of controlling law.” Id. Thus, until the Supreme 
Court of the United States prescribes a different standard, any infringement on a parent’s 
right to interstate travel in a custody determination is subject to strict scrutiny and may 
only survive if narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Jones v. Jones, 
2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603. 
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2. States have a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children, and a 
custody determination will survive strict scrutiny when it is narrowly 
tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. 
  
States have a compelling interest in protecting the best interests of children, 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984), and a custody determination will survive 
when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. Jones v. Jones, 
2015 UT 84, ¶ 27, 359 P.3d 603. 
In a custody determination, the “paramount consideration is the best interest of the 
child.” Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982); UTAH CODE § 30-3-10(a) 
(“In determining any form of custody . . . the court shall consider the best interests of the 
child.”). Indeed, the best-interests approach “has long been the bellwether indicator of 
custody determinations . . . .” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting 
part and concurring in part). The best-interests approach, rooted in the wisdom of Utah 
courts and the Utah Legislature, represents a compelling state interest. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed that “[t]he State, of 
course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children.” Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). This Court has recognized that the objective of 
preserving the best interests of children is “among the most important of any in our 
society.” In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 74, 358 P.3d 1009. Thus, the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting the best interests of the children in custody 
determinations. “Were that not the case, every custody determination would be 
constitutionally infirm because every custody determination would limit parental rights 
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on some lesser showing [than a compelling interest].” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, 
¶ 54 (Zane, J. dissenting part and concurring in part). 
  In determining which situation will serve the best interests of the children, a trial 
court may consider “numerous factors, each of which may vary in importance according 
to the facts in the particular case.” Sanderson v. Tyson, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987). 
Those factors may include “the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents in 
light of a realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of a child.” Elmer v. Elmer, 776 
P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989). For example, in the present case, the district court was 
persuaded by the custody evaluator’s testimony that, “[w]here it’s possible to structure 
parent-child interactions in the way Ms. Felix contemplates, our studies show there is no 
better recipe for a positive relationship.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 19 
(majority).  
Given the breadth of factors that a trial court may consider, it is difficult to 
imagine a custody dispute where the best interests of the children are equally served by 
awarding custody to either parent. Still, the court of appeals expressed serious concern 
about this slight possibility.  Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 39 (majority) (“[I]f a 
court concludes that the best interests of the children are going to be served equally well 
by either custody determination, then [the best-interests] approach would give as much 
weight to a coin toss as it would to the parents’ rights.”). However, in such a rare 
circumstance, applying strict scrutiny provides an adequate solution. 
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A custody determination that infringes a parent’s right to interstate travel will only 
survive if it is both justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. If the best interests of the children will be equally served by either parent, a court 
may determine that a custody arrangement is narrowly tailored when it does the least 
harm to the parents’ competing rights to interstate travel. Ultimately, however, trial 
courts are well-equipped to make difficult decisions based on the facts of each case. Any 
potential for difficult decision-making should not dissuade this Court from holding that 
the infringement of a parent’s right to interstate travel warrants strict scrutiny, and that a 
custody determination will survive strict scrutiny when it is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the best interests of the children. 
Because parents enjoy a fundamental right to interstate travel, any infringement on 
that right must be subject to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, a custody determination may 
only survive when it is narrowly tailored to achieve the best interests of the children. This 
approach is dictated by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and 
the Utah legislature. What’s more, the best-interests approach produced desirable results 
because it avoids harm to both parents and children. 
B.    The Best-Interests Approach Avoids Harm to Parents and Children 
Because It Does Not Attempt to Value One Parent’s Rights Over 
Another Parent’s Rights and Does Not Yield an Outcome that 
Undermines the Children’s Best Interests. 
  
A custody determination that is based on the best interests of the children avoids 
harm to parents and children. It does not require courts to determine whether one parent’s 
constitutional right to interstate travel supersedes another parent’s constitutional right to 
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interstate travel. Moreover, it does not yield an outcome that undermines the best-
interests of the children. 
1. The best-interests approach avoids a determination that one parent’s right to 
interstate travel is weightier than another parent’s right to interstate travel. 
  
If this Court embarks on an “enterprise . . . of abandoning the usual standard for a 
lesser one that balances the relevant interests in a new way,” Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, 
¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603, district courts will be obliged to determine whether one parent’s 
rights are weightier than another parent’s rights. Specifically, the standard recommended 
by the Utah Court of Appeals would require district courts to balance each parent’s right 
to interstate travel, against the right of each parent to “to maintain close association and 
frequent contact with the child,” against the best interests of the children. Felix v. Sero, 
2017 UT App 723, ¶ 40 (quoting In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146 
(Colo. 2005). 
To be sure, courts frequently balance the rights and interests of relevant parties. 
Matter of Adoption of Baby Q, 2016 UT 29, ¶ 11, 379 P.3d 1231 (balancing the interests 
of parties to an adoption). In the adoption context, the Utah Legislature has made clear 
that the best interests of the child should govern the determination, and that “the rights 
and interests of all parties affected by an adoption proceeding must be considered and 
balanced in determining what constitutional protections and processes are necessary and 
appropriate.” UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(1), (3). The Legislature notes the varied rights 
and interests of the biological parents, the adoptive parents, and the state. Id. at § 78B-6-
102(5). In accounting for these rights and interests, the Legislature specifies that courts 
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should determine what “constitutional protections and processes are necessary . . ..” Id. at 
§ 78B-6-102(3). 
In custody determinations following divorce, the best-interests approach provides 
the necessary constitutional protection: strict scrutiny. To move further would be to work 
an injustice. Beyond subjecting the infringement of each parents’ right to interstate travel 
to strict scrutiny, it is difficult to see how a court could determine that one parent’s right 
is weightier than the other. Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting part 
and concurring in part). For example, while Mr. Sero enjoys a right to maintain a 
residence in Utah, Ms. Felix enjoys a right to seek opportunity in South Carolina. Both 
rights are fundamental and are protected equally by the Constitution of the United States. 
“Perhaps the [court of appeals] means that, on balance, one parent is less likely to be 
harmed by losing that right, but that seems to me to be poor justification for a 
constitutional infringement.” Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 55 (Zane, J. dissenting 
part and concurring in part). Any determination that one parent’s right to travel is 
weightier than the other parent’s right to travel would be constitutionally infirm because 
the state would not have a compelling justification for infringing one parent’s right to 
travel if the custody determination is not based on the best interests of the children. 
Holding that a custody determination should be governed by the best interests of 
the children will avoid the injustice of finding that one parent’s fundamental right to 
interstate travel is weightier than the other parent’s fundamental right to interstate travel. 
Instead, it provides the necessary constitutional protections by subjecting any 
infringement of the parents’ respective rights to strict scrutiny. This approach not only 
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serves the interests of each parent, it avoids an outcome that is contrary to the children’s 
best interests. 
2. The best-interests approach avoids an outcome that undermines the best 
interests of the children. 
  
A custody determination should be governed by the best interests of the children, 
in harmony with Utah Code section 30-3-10(a) and in accord with a long line of custody 
determinations wherein the “paramount consideration is the best interest of the child.” 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). Such a determination is “based on 
an objective and impartial comparison of the parenting skills, character, and abilities of 
both parents in light of a realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of a child.” Elmer 
v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989). If this Court turns away from the best-interests 
approach and adopts a test that “balances the relevant interests in a new way,” Jones v. 
Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 29, 359 P.3d 603, district courts would be compelled to turn their 
focus away from the best interests of the children.  
Any outcome that turns on the parents’ right to interstate travel would necessarily 
undermine the best interests of the children and run contrary to the Legislature’s directive 
in Utah Code section 30-3-10. It is possible that after weighing each parent’s right to 
interstate travel, a court may well make a custody determination that is consistent with its 
“objective and impartial” determination of the children’s best interests. Elmer, 776 P.2d 
at 603; Felix v. Sero, 2017 UT App 723, ¶ 42 (noting that, on remand, the district court 
may still award primary custody to Ms. Felix after balancing Mr. Sero’s right to travel 
against Ms. Felix’s right to travel). 
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However, if the predicted outcome ever changes after an evaluation of each 
parent’s right to interstate travel, then the court has necessarily acted contrary to the 
children’s best interests. Following a court’s “objective and impartial” assessment of the 
children’s best interests, any custody determination to the contrary, made in light of a 
parent’s right to travel, does harm to the children. Any such determination runs contrary 
to the legislative directive set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-10 and violates the state’s 
“duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children . . . .” Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
Thus, the best-interests approach avoids harm to children because it ensures 
outcomes that are consistent with a court’s “objective and impartial” determination of the 
custody arrangement that will protect the children’s best interests. Because the best-
interests approach is harmonious with competing constitutional concerns and because it 
avoids harm to parents and children, this Court should hold that a custody determination 
is properly based on the best interests of the children. 
II. LACHES MAY NOT BE USED TO CUT SHORT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
BECAUSE SUCH A READING RENDERS A TERM OF THE STATUTE A NULLITY 
AND VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
  
 The Utah Legislature enacted a statute of limitations for bringing a claim for 
unpaid child support expenses that runs “within four years after the date the youngest 
child reaches majority” or “eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment 
. . . .” UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202 (6)(a)(i)–(ii). The Legislature also acted to foreclose 
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defenses of waiver and estoppel in most claims for unpaid child support.1 UTAH CODE 
§ 78B-12-109 (1)–(2). In Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 18, 339 P.3d 131 
(“Veysey I”), the Utah Court of Appeals refused to read the Legislature’s bar on waiver 
and estoppel claims to also act as a bar on the related defense of laches. Id. In doing so, 
the court held that a party could assert laches to cut short the legislatively defined statute 
of limitations, regardless of the Legislature’s bar on claims for estoppel. Id. ¶ 18 n.6. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in Veysey v. Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14, 397 
P.3d 846 (“Veysey II”). 
This case is factually similar to Veysey I and Veysey II. Here, Ms. Felix makes 
several claims for unpaid childcare expenses that were not foreclosed by the statute of 
limitations (R. ¶ 15). Though the statute of limitations had not yet barred the claims, the 
district court and the court of appeals both found that Ms. Felix’s claims were foreclosed 
by Mr. Sero’s laches defense. (R. ¶ 43). Both courts were “bound by precedent” from 
Veysey I and Veysey II in reaching this decision. (R. ¶ 43).  
We ask this Court to reconsider the holding that a party may use laches to cut short 
the applicable statute of limitations for two reasons: (A) the close link between estoppel 
and laches creates ambiguity, and reading the statute to allow laches but not estoppel 
renders the bar on estoppel a nullity, and (B) allowing parties to use laches to cut short 
                                                        
1 In this section of the statute, the Legislature only allows defenses of waiver and 
estoppel “when there is no order already established by a tribunal if the custodial 
parent freely and voluntarily waives support specifically and in writing.” UTAH 
CODE 78B-12-109 (1). Additionally, the court in Veysey I held that “variable 
daycare expenses constitute child support.” Id. ¶ 15.  
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the statute of limitations violates separation of powers by overlooking a clear command 
from the Legislature and primarily resulting in limitation of financial resources for 
children. 
A.  Reading the Statute to Foreclose Waiver and Estoppel But Allow 
Laches Renders the Legislature’s Bar on Estoppel a Nullity. 
  
         When interpreting a statute, the court’s primary goal is to “give effect to the 
legislature’s intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.” Garfield 
County v. United States, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15,--- P.3d ---; State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 
¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276. In order to understand and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose, 
courts often examine (1) whether, after a plain language analysis, a statute’s terms remain 
ambiguous, or “susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations” State v. Rasabout, 
2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258; Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15, and (2), where statutory 
language is ambiguous, whether utilizing established canons of statutory interpretation 
may eliminate ambiguity. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50, 
¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863; Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992. 
1.    The Legislature’s use of “waiver and estoppel” is ambiguous as to whether 
it also prohibits the similar defense of laches. 
          
         In general, where a statute’s plain language is “unambiguous and provides a 
workable result,” the court may end its analysis there. Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 15. 
However, if after a plain language analysis, a term of the statute remains ambiguous, or 
“susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” the court may look to established 
canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22. 
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The doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel have been closely linked in Utah 
case law for years. This close link creates ambiguity. Many Utah cases refer to the 
doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel as a single unit. See e.g., State Bank of Southern 
Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (referring 
to a bank’s claims as being “barred by laches, waiver and estoppel.”); K.O. v. Denison, 
748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (providing that a party is barred from asserting a 
claim by “laches, waiver, and estoppel”); 20C AmJur Pl. & Pr. Forms Quieting title § 67 
(referring to the doctrine as “estoppel by laches”); 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 31:2 (5th ed.) (referring to the doctrine as “estoppel by laches”). The 
doctrines of laches, waiver and estoppel are so closely related that, in 31 Williston on 
Contracts § 79:11 (4th ed.), Samuel Williston described laches as “operat[ing] as an 
estoppel against the assertion of a right.” Id. This quotation, in particular, suggests that 
laches is a subset of the broader doctrine of estoppel.2 
         Though laches and estoppel require parties to show different elements, the two 
doctrines are similar in the type of harm they redress and in the specific remedy they 
provide. Estoppel is defined as “a[n] act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on 
                                                        
2 One reason that laches was often treated as a subset of estoppel in Utah case 
law and national treaties is because they were generally brought as a tandem 
defense. See e.g. Burmingham v. Burke, 245 P. 977, 979–80 (Utah 1926) (providing 
an example of the defenses of estoppel and laches being asserted together). 
Indeed, in most cases where laches could be successfully asserted as a defense, 
estoppel would also apply. Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) 
(discussing the defense of estoppel to a claim for unpaid child support). 
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the basis of the first party's . . . act, or failure to act; and injury to the second party that 
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such . . . act, or 
failure to act.” CEOC Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969–70 (Utah 
1989); while laches requires a party to show “[t]he lack of diligence on the part of 
plaintiff; [and a]n injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.” Papanikolas 
Bros. Enter. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
The difference in these two doctrines is slight. Estoppel is broader than laches, and 
can apply to actions as well as inactions, and estoppel does not require an unreasonable 
delay in time. Laches operates in a similar fashion, but only applies to the inaction of one 
party which injures another party. Moreover, the classic understanding is that laches is a 
defense which prevents parties from unreasonably delaying to bring a claim. Borland ex 
rel. Utah State Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). In most 
cases, parties can achieve the same remedy for the same harm using either laches or 
estoppel. Therefore, the slight differences between laches and estoppel do not serve to 
divide the doctrines, but rather to show that laches falls under the broad umbrella of 
estoppel. 
Based on the close link between the doctrines of estoppel and laches, and the 
overlapping nature of the claims, the use of “waiver and estoppel” in the statute is 
ambiguous and requires additional interpretation beyond a plain language reading. 
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2.   The absurd consequences canon inclines away from a reading that 
nullifies a term of the statute. 
  
After identifying ambiguity in a statute, the next step is to look to accepted canons 
of construction. “When statutory language is ambiguous—in that its terms remain 
susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain 
language analysis—we generally resort to other modes of statutory construction” Marion 
Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14; Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22. One such mode of statutory 
construction is the absurd consequences canon. This canon provides that courts should 
preserve legislative intent and resolve ambiguity by reading a statute in a way that does 
not “render[] a provision a nullity.” Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 23. 
Before moving forward, it is important to distinguish the absurd consequences 
canon from the absurdity doctrine. Both interpretive tools deal in absurd results, however 
the absurd consequences canon is a gentle tool, which steers ambiguous statutory 
language toward a reading that does not render any term of the statute null. Utley, 2015 
UT 75, ¶ 46. (Durrant, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In contrast, the 
absurdity doctrine has been characterized as “strong medicine, not to be administered 
lightly” Garfield, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 44 (Voros, J., dissenting). The absurdity doctrine “has 
nothing to do with resolving ambiguities. Rather, we apply this [doctrine] to reform 
unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain language leads to results so 
overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have intended them.” Utley, 2015 UT 
75, ¶ 46. In this case, we do not suggest that the Legislature’s bar on waiver and estoppel 
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but not laches is “overwhelmingly absurd,” but rather that it is ambiguous. Id. To resolve 
this ambiguity, we use the absurd consequences canon.  
The policy behind the absurd consequences canon is to create a preference for 
interpretations of statutes that do not “invite[] confusion [or create] piecemeal litigation, a 
waste of judicial resources, [or] gamesmanship in the payment of claims.” Encon Utah, 
LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 73, 210 P.3d 263 (emphasis added). In 
Encon, the Utah Supreme Court used the absurd consequences canon in the judgment of a 
contractor’s claim for unpaid work from a subcontractor. The court rejected an 
interpretation of the statute that would attach a separate statute of limitations to each 
individual piece of work a subcontractor completed for a contractor. Id. ¶ 74. The court 
noted that this “create[s] an unworkable standard” by creating a series of unpredictable 
timelines for bringing claims and encouraging gamesmanship in the payment of claims.” 
Id. Therefore, the court adopted an interpretation of the statute that would avoid this 
confusion. Id. 
The absurd consequences canon can help us avoid a similarly confusing result 
here. Given the facts in this case and the court of appeals’ reading of the statute, Mr. Sero 
would be prohibited from asserting estoppel, however Mr. Sero achieved effectively the 
same result by claiming laches. The practical result in reading the statute to bar estoppel 
but not laches is the same as if the Legislature did not bar estoppel at all. As in Utley, the 
Veysey II court’s interpretation of the statute as not barring laches in addition to estoppel 
renders the Legislature’s bar on estoppel a nullity. Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 23. Furthermore, 
allowing laches encourages “gamesmanship in the payment of claims,” by encouraging 
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parties to strategically assert laches to avoid payment of unpaid childcare expenses. To 
avoid rendering the bar on estoppel a nullity, this Court should read the bar on estoppel to 
include laches. 
B.   Allowing Laches to Cut Short the Statute of Limitations Violates 
Separation of Powers by Overlooking a Clear Command From the 
Legislature and Creating Injustice For the Children. 
  
         Utah’s Constitution provides for separation of powers in Article V, Section 1. 
“The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others . . . .” UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1.  Regarding 
the roles of the distinct branches of Utah’s government, the Utah Supreme Court 
provides, “It is the judiciary's role to interpret statutes and to ensure their constitutionality 
. . . It is not the judiciary's role to augment existing statutes to satisfy private parties . . . 
nor to enforce statutes where no judicial remedy for private parties is anticipated or 
provided for in the statute.” Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 39, 
---P.3d--- (citations omitted).  
         Here, the application of laches to cut short the statute of limitations for bringing 
child support claims violates separation of powers for two reasons: (1) by creating a 
statute of limitations and barring claims for waiver and estoppel, the Legislature issued a 
“clear command” to the court to give up its equitable powers, and (2) the Legislature is in 
the best position to decide the amount of time a parent has to bring a claim for unpaid 
child support to avoid familial strain and injustice for children. 
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1.    By creating a statute of limitations and barring claims for waiver and 
estoppel, the Legislature issued a “clear command” to the court to give up 
its equitable powers. 
  
         The court in Veysey II refused to “construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional 
equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command’ or an ‘inescapable inference’ to the 
contrary.” Veysey II, ¶ 7 n.4 (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000)). 
However, the court in Miller used that standard to hold that the statutory mandate of an 
“automatic stay” to enjoin relief from substandard prison conditions, upon a motion to 
modify or terminate the relief, did in fact provide a clear command from Congress to 
displace the court’s traditional equitable powers to grant injunctions. Miller, 530 U.S. at 
340–41 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2)). Note that the Miller court did not require the 
Legislature to specifically include a provision barring the court from using its injunctive 
powers. Id. at 341. The court found that, by mandating an automatic stay rather than 
allowing courts to hear motions for injunctions, the Legislature issued a clear command 
for the court to give up injunctive powers. 
         In this case, we have a similar statutory instruction. Utah Code § 78B-12-109 
provides that “waiver and estoppel” shall not apply to most claims for child support. This 
provision is analogous to the provision in Miller that limits a court’s traditional equitable 
powers. Miller, 530 U.S. at 333. Both provisions restrict courts’ ability to use certain 
traditional equitable powers: injunctions for Miller, and estoppel in our case. The Miller 
court found that the Legislature’s express instructions on how to handle injunctions in 
cases falling under the statute was a sufficient command to the court to displace its 
traditional equitable powers. Id. at 341. Likewise, this Court should hold that the 
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Legislature’s express prohibition on defenses of estoppel constitutes a clear command for 
the court to give up the equitable power of estoppel, as well as any equitable powers 
which may be used to achieve the same substantive result. See infra (A)(i). 
         Moreover, in light of the canon of constitutional avoidance, reading the statute to 
include laches in the definition of estoppel is a practical choice. The canon of 
constitutional avoidance allows the court to “[reject] one of two plausible constructions 
of a statute on the ground that it would raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality.” 
Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 UT 34, ¶ 38, 345 P.3d 719. Reading the statute, as Mr. Sero 
urges, to allow a party to assert laches to cut short the statute of limitations raises 
separation of powers questions. Laches is meant to be used as a gap-filler in order to 
effectuate Legislative intent. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1962, 
1973 (2014). When laches is used to alter statutory timelines, it creates grave concerns as 
to whether the court is taking on a Legislative function. The canon of constitutional 
avoidance provides an additional ground for reading the bar on estoppel as a bar on 
laches as well—to avoid the constitutional problem that comes with the use of an 
equitable doctrine to effectively rewrite a statutory mandate. 
         Therefore, the Legislature’s bar on defenses of estoppel constitutes a clear 
command from congress to relinquish the court’s equitable powers. This Court should 
read the statute to also bar laches to avoid overlooking a clear command from congress 
and ultimately creating a constitutionally questionable reading. 
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2.  The Legislature should decide the amount of time a parent has to bring a 
claim for unpaid child support to avoid familial strain and injustice for 
children. 
 
          The Utah Supreme Court in Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 33, 269 P.3d 141 
provides, “Our understanding of the legislative power is informed by its placement in 
relation to—and separation from—the executive and judicial power.” Id. In Alpine 
Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ---P.3d--- , the court noted that “it is the 
judiciary’s role to interpret statutes and to ensure their constitutionality. It is not the 
judiciary’s role to augment existing statutes to satisfy private parties . . . where no judicial 
remedy for private parties is anticipated or provided for by the statute.” Id. ¶ 39. 
         The line between Legislative and Judicial power is not a bright one. Utah, like 
most other jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction between law and equity. Borland, 
733 P.2d at 146. However, the blending of law and equity does not create a presumption 
that allowing principles of equity to alter statutes will always be proper. Borland goes on 
to note that “[i]t is well established that equitable defenses may be applied in actions at 
law and that principles of equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, the rule allowing equitable principles to apply at law is a 
permissive one, and one that allows the Judiciary to reach into the Legislative realm only 
when necessary to prevent injustice.  
Additionally, the court in Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 20, 321 
P.3d 1021 held that “the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute 
of limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been 
satisfied.” Id. ¶ 18. However, Insight Assets authorized a court to allow laches to prevent 
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injustice based on weighing the equities for two parties in a business transaction, where 
the equities may be reduced to dollar-amount damages. 
         In this case, the determination of equities and injustice is more complicated. 
Injustice is a matter of perspective. The equities in divorce cases are dissimilar to the 
equities in Insight Assets, in that courts in divorce actions must consider what is fair and 
equitable for the children above what seems unfair to a parent. The Utah Legislature 
addressed this issue in statute: “In determining any form of custody, including a change 
in custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child . . . .” UTAH CODE § 30-
3-10(a) Moreover, Utah courts have long held that “the determining factor [in divorce 
where children are involved] is the best interests and welfare of the child.” Walton v. 
Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 100 (Utah 1946); Kielkowski v. Kielkowski, 2015 UT App 59, 
¶ 21, 346 P.3d 690. Mr. Sero argued below that the injustice in this case, which justified 
the defense of laches, was that “Ms. Felix’s lack of diligence . . . by waiting nearly ten 
years to do anything about the unpaid amounts . . . had allowed the outstanding amount 
attributable to Mr. Sero to rise to nearly $24,000.” (R. ¶ 26). While this is certainly a 
hardship for Mr. Sero, it does not rise to the level of injustice that would allow the court 
to override the statute of limitations. Here, allowing Mr. Sero to assert laches to cut short 
the statute of limitations is not necessary to prevent injustice, and actually creates 
injustice from the perspective of his children for three reasons. 
         First, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates a mandate that 
parents must sue each other as quickly as possible to avoid having laches asserted against 
them, barring their recovery. This policy forces parents to litigate rather than giving them 
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time to settle overdue child support claims outside of court. The statute of limitations 
considers the problems that come with forcing parents of young children to sue each 
other or risk losing their claim, by allowing parents to wait until their children reach 
majority to bring claims for unpaid child support. UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202. Forcing 
divorced couples to litigate or lose their claim in an uncertain amount of time due to 
laches ultimately results in injustice to the children of divorce, who then have to watch 
their parents sue each other over which parent has to pay for the child. 
          Second, the timelines for bringing claims for payment of child support is a matter 
of public policy and should be decided by the Legislature. In the context of real estate 
development, the court in Alpine Homes held that where “the right to a refund of unspent 
impact fees, or [the existence of] an enforcement provision, or if they do not like the 
ways that impact fees are calculated or may be expended, they can seek legislative 
modification of the statute.” Id. ¶ 40. These matters are analogous to provisions for child 
support actions. If parties believe that the timelines for bringing child support claims are 
unfair, it is the role of the Legislature to modify the statute of limitations, not the role of 
the court to cut short the statute of limitations in individual cases. 
Third, it is well-established that the purpose of laches is to punish “those who 
slumber on their rights.” Insight Assets, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 17. However, when laches is used 
to prevent a claim for overdue child support, the punishment primarily affects the 
children. Children have a right to child support from both parents, and, until they reach 
majority, are not capable of “sleeping” on these rights as Insight Assets suggests. 
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Allowing a parent to avoid paying child support for their child is not an appropriate 
remedy for one parent’s delay. 
For these reasons, allowing laches to cut short the statute of limitations creates 
injustice for the children in these divorce actions. Injustice, which ultimately leads to a 
strained home life, and a limitation of financial resources for children of divorce. In light 
of the clear legislative act here, allowing laches to alter the statute of limitations violates 
separation of powers by creating serious injustice for the most important parties: Mr. 
Sero’s and Ms. Felix’s children. 
CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals decision 
that a custody determination must balance the parents’ competing rights to interstate 
travel. Instead, this Court should hold that a custody determination should turn on the 
best interests of the children. Additionally, this Court should overturn court of appeals 
precedent in Veysey I and Veysey II by holding that the defense of laches is not available 
to cut short an applicable statute of limitations. These holdings will serve the best 
interests of children in divorce cases, both on a broad public policy level, and in the 
specific factual circumstances of this case.  
 
SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 2018. 
/s/ Team #2470 
Team #2470 




  2470 
 39 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
In compliance with the requirements of UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a), we certify that this 
brief contains all of the sections required by the Utah Rules of appellate procedure. 
Pursuant to UTAH R. TRAYNOR P. (3)(a) we certify that this brief is less than 40-pages, 
excluding the table of contents, table of authorities, statement of the issues presented, and 
addenda. We certify that this brief uses a proportionally spaced Book Antiqua 13-point 
font using Microsoft Word 2017, and In compliance with the typeface requirements of 
UTAH R. APP. P. 27(b). 
                                                                          
        /s/ Team #2470 
 Team #2470 




































This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed 
on May 31, 2017. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the 
following issues. 
1.  Whether a custody determination must take into account a parents’ 
right to interstate travel, as established by the United States Constitution. 
2.  Whether the existence of an applicable statute of limitations forecloses 
a party from asserting laches as a defense, where the period for establishing 
laches is shorter than the applicable statute of limitations. 
For the Court 
 
Dated:  June 10, 2017         
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Before Judges Sutherland, Marshall, and Zane. 
SUTHERLAND, Judge: 
¶ 1 This case presents two issues arising from the parties’ performance under a 
divorce decree and a recent attempt by the petitioner, Ms. Felix, to have that decree 
modified in light of changed circumstances. Ms. Felix and Mr. Sero were married from 
1996 to 2005, when they divorced and sole physical custody of their two children was 
awarded to Mr. Sero. A number of features of the parties’ relationship and performance 
under the divorce decree were raised below, but only two issues are presented on 
appeal.  
¶ 2 First, we address an issue of constitutional concern arising from the district court 
apparently conditioning Mr. Sero’s custody of his children on his willingness to relocate 
to South Carolina. In the years since the parties’ divorce was finalized, Mr. Sero has had 
primary physical custody of his children and, by all accounts, has provided stellar care 
for his children. Nonetheless, circumstances have changed such that the district court 
concluded that it is in the children’s best interests to award primary custody to their 
mother, Ms. Felix, who will be moving with the children to South Carolina. The district 
court offered to preserve the current custody arrangement were Mr. Sero to move to 
South Carolina to live within one hour of Ms. Felix, but Mr. Sero declined that offer. Mr. 
Sero appealed the portion of the judgment granting custody to Ms. Felix, arguing that it 
infringes his right to interstate travel under the United States Constitution. We agree 
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with Mr. Sero and reverse the portion of the district court’s judgment awarding sole 
physical custody to Ms. Felix.  
¶ 3 Second, we address the relationship between the doctrine of laches and an 
applicable statute of limitations. Although the parties’ divorce decree provides for an 
equal distribution of child care expenses, Ms. Felix has borne the lion’s share of costs 
associated with child care expenses. This is because, shortly after the decree was 
finalized, Ms. Felix transitioned the children into a daycare that cost more each month 
than the daycare the children had been attending when the parties were married. Ms. 
Felix notified Mr. Sero of the transition and asked that he pay his share of the increased 
portion of expenses, but Mr. Sero never made those increased payments. When Ms. 
Felix brought this action to modify the decree, she also raised the issue of the unpaid 
amounts for child care expenses. Relying on recent precedent from a panel of this court, 
the district court concluded that Ms. Felix’s claims for unpaid childcare expenses are 
barred by the doctrine of laches. Although we disagree with that rule and urge the Utah 
Supreme Court to consider the issue, the district court did not err in adhering to that 
precedent. We affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to the laches issue. 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 This case arises from Ms. Felix’s petition seeking to modify a divorce decree that 
has remained unchanged since it was issued in 2005. Under that decree, Mr. Sero was 
granted sole physical custody of the parties’ two children. The district court found, and 
we agree, that Mr. Sero did an exceptional job as the custodial parent of his children for 
the ten years following the entry of that decree. But in early 2015, circumstances 
between the parties changed when new professional opportunities presented 
themselves to Ms. Felix.1  
The Parties’ Divorce and Mr. Sero’s Time as Caregiver 
¶ 5 Following a marriage that lasted nearly ten years, Mr. Sero and Ms. Felix (Mrs. 
Sero at the time) divorced in 2005. This case arises from Ms. Felix’s petition, seeking to 
modify the divorce decree and related orders regarding custody and childcare 
expenses. Pursuant to the initial decree and related orders, Mr. Sero was granted sole 
physical custody of the parties’ two children, who were ages one and three at the time 
                                                                                                 
1 We pause here to note that, while the record developed in the district court was 
voluminous, the two issues raised on appeal are quite narrow compared to the scope of 
the proceedings below. Accordingly, we confine our recitation of facts to matters that 
are germane to the disposition of this appeal and that are clearly set forth in the district 
court’s factual findings, none of which has been contested by either party.   
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of divorce. In the years following their divorce, the parties very amicably and 
conscientiously handled Ms. Felix’s visitation of her children, adhering to mutually 
acceptable parenting plans that are consistent with the standards set forth in the 
applicable provisions of the Utah Code.  
¶ 6 Nevertheless, in his role as the physical custodian of the children, Mr. Sero 
indisputably handled the greater share of the parenting responsibilities. And it is clear 
that Mr. Sero handled that responsibility very well. The district court found that Mr. 
Sero “consistently acted in the best interests of his children, always putting their needs 
ahead of his own.” We note two recent examples of such actions cited by the district 
court as being persuasive when making that finding.  
¶ 7 First, in 2013, Mr. Sero’s brother won an all-expenses-paid trip to Bavaria for 
himself and a guest, and asked Mr. Sero to join him as the guest. Mr. Sero declined 
when it became clear that the trip would conflict with his daughter’s ballet recital and 
his son’s little league baseball playoffs. Mr. Sero testified that “I had arranged for the 
kids to stay with my parents, and I knew that if I went on the trip, the kids would be 
fine, but I also knew that sometimes the most important thing to a kid is to look out in 
the audience and know that your dad is there to support you.”  
¶ 8 Second, in 2014, Mr. Sero’s daughter was sick and, after a short stay in the 
hospital, required several days of attentive home care. Mr. Sero missed work to provide 
that care, which created a hardship because his employment did not provide for sick 
leave to cover the extended absence. Mr. Sero traded shifts with co-workers, worked 
from home when possible, and navigated that difficult time while fulfilling his 
obligations to his employer and to his family. The district court found that “such 
delicate balancing of professional and parenting obligations is not glamorous, but is 
central to sound parenting.”   
¶ 9 Citing these, and other similar acts, a court-ordered custody evaluator concluded 
that it was beyond dispute that Mr. Sero provided a “stable, supportive, and positive 
growth environment for the children” and had, “as well as any parent [she had] ever 
encountered, balanced the competing obligations of career, child care, and maintaining 
positive relationships with an ex-spouse.” The district court credited the evaluator’s 
conclusion and indicated that it would take a “strong showing” by Ms. Felix to justify 
disrupting that positive status quo. 
Ms. Felix’s Professional Opportunity 
¶ 10 Ms. Felix was generally present and supportive as her children grew and very 
actively parented when called for under the parties’ visitation plans. But it is fair to say 
that the parents took different approaches to providing for their children’s well-being. 
While Mr. Sero was frequently engaged in the difficult day-to-day effort that comes 
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along with being the primary caregiver, Ms. Felix was, in her words “investing in the 
children’s future.”   
¶ 11 Mr. Sero agreed that Ms. Felix always “did what she said she would do, even if it 
was hard to get her to ever go above and beyond, like when [our daughter] got sick.”  
Mr. Sero also testified that “[Ms. Felix] has been a good mom, and she makes the most 
of the time she spends with our kids; I’m not going to dwell on whether she could have 
done some things differently, because we always talked about how to balance things 
and she always at least did what she said she would do.” He also said, “so, while I 
guess I did a lot more over the last ten years, I won’t complain because that’s how we 
always shared the load.”   
¶ 12 There was a justifiable reason for Ms. Felix’s different approach to parent-time: 
she was pursuing an advanced degree in chemical engineering. That pursuit resulted in 
her having less flexibility to respond to unanticipated events and substantially limited 
her availability compared to Mr. Sero. That said, the court-appointed custody evaluator 
testified that Ms. Felix’s parenting was “also outstanding,” specifically saying that 
“parents who juggle relationships with their children while pursuing advanced degrees 
have a uniquely difficult task in weighing the benefits of being present for day-to-day 
support against the value of laying the groundwork for a better future; Ms. Felix 
exercised good judgment in making those decisions and, despite how difficult it must 
have been, gave her children a level of attentiveness and support on par with a parent 
with fewer obligations or ambitions.”    
¶ 13 Ms. Felix’s pursuit has now yielded the benefits she always hoped it would. She 
was awarded her Ph.D. in 2015 and, on the strength of the technological breakthroughs 
described in her graduate thesis, was courted by several pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Her new professional opportunities were the catalyst for her bringing this case. 
Childcare Expenses 
¶ 14 Important for this appeal, the parties relied on professional childcare providers 
to watch their children while they were at work or, in Ms. Felix’s case, in classes or the 
laboratory pursuing her degree. At the time of their divorce, the children were enrolled 
at a daycare center near the facility where Ms. Felix worked at the time. Following the 
divorce, Ms. Felix transitioned the children to a daycare center that offered a more 
robust curriculum, smaller classroom sizes, more stringent accreditation standards, and 
generally had a better reputation for providing quality childcare. The new facility also 
cost $400/month more than the previous facility. Mr. Sero liked the new facility not 
only because of the higher quality of care, but also because it was closer to his home, 
making it easier to pick up and drop off the children, which was most frequently his 
responsibility.  
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¶ 15 The parties’ practice for dividing up expenses had Ms. Felix paying the daycare 
and seeking reimbursement from Mr. Sero. Immediately following the transition, Ms. 
Felix provided written verification to Mr. Sero of the increased rates and told him to 
start paying more to cover his share, but Mr. Sero never did so. Mr. Sero testified that he 
received that notice and was aware of the obligation,2 but did not think it applied when 
Ms. Felix made the change without consulting him. Notably, until she sought 
reimbursement in these proceedings, Ms. Felix never pressed the matter—she covered 
the increased costs without ever receiving the additional contributions from Mr. Sero. 
She testified in the district court that “there were always a lot of things that weren’t 
running perfectly—payment for this expense or that, swapping weekends even when it 
wasn’t convenient—and it just wasn’t always feasible to turn those issues into a fight or 
go to court every time something came up.” 
The Justification for Relocating the Children 
¶ 16 Following publication of her thesis, Ms. Felix garnered substantial attention from 
employers in the pharmaceutical industry. Within a few weeks, she received competing 
job offers from four different pharmaceutical manufacturers. The specific job 
responsibilities and financial compensation varied slightly from offer to offer, but 
generally speaking, Ms. Felix had her choice of high-level positions at any of the largest 
and most powerful pharmaceutical companies in the United States. All of those offers 
would have required her to relocate to a state on the East Coast.  
¶ 17 One of these companies was willing to entertain a unique “quality of life” 
package that Ms. Felix carefully negotiated, in her words, to “make up for lost time.”  
By conceding some financial benefit, she was able to obtain significant benefits related 
to the children and her ability to spend time with them. First, the offer entitles her to 
substantial periods of leave and a structured work schedule. Until the children graduate 
high school, Ms. Felix may take leave for two weeks at a time, six times per year. And 
when she is not on leave, Ms. Felix will be required to work no more than 40 hours per 
week. The negotiated employment arrangement also included a generous policy for 
sick-leave (above and beyond the scheduled leave), in case health problems arise again 
for either of the children. Second, the company also agreed to cover the costs of tuition 
and extra-curricular activities at any one of several private schools identified by the 
company. Third, the children would be entitled to free enrollment for two different 
study-abroad experiences during summers when they are in high school.  
¶ 18 The key limitation to this offer is the requirement that Ms. Felix must relocate to 
South Carolina to take advantage of these benefits. The company’s ability to cover 
tuition costs results from certain contractual relationships that it has entered into with 
private schools near its headquarters. The study-abroad experiences require attendance, 
                                                                                                 
2 Mr. Sero concedes the notice was adequate under Utah Code section 78B-12-214. 
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in person, at weekly training sessions with group leaders and fellow travelers for the 
eight weeks leading up to the departure of the trip at the beginning of each summer. 
And while the company does not prohibit Ms. Felix from traveling during her two-
week leave periods, they “strongly encourage” her to remain in the immediate vicinity 
of their headquarters because of the possibility—however unlikely—that she will be 
required to assist with highly technical, and highly time-sensitive, chemistry.3   
¶ 19 The district court’s findings gave “no meaningful weight” to the compensation 
structure Ms. Felix had negotiated, on the basis that modifications to the parties’ child 
support order could effectuate a redistribution of this new wealth, regardless of which 
parent was awarded custody. But the district court found the other aspects of the new 
arrangement to weigh heavily in favor of modifying the custody arrangement. The 
court relied on two key pieces of testimony. First, the court was persuaded by the 
custody evaluator’s testimony that the proposed structure was perhaps the best 
conceivable approach to childhood development for teenagers:  
Based on our current understanding of the developmental 
needs of teenagers, I urge the court to grant custody to Ms. 
Felix. Putting teens in good schools positions them for future 
success. Participating in varied extra-curricular activities not 
only contributes to their happiness and growth, but also sets 
them up to succeed outside of a classroom. The study abroad 
experiences raise cultural awareness and instill in teenagers a 
sense of their role in the world, at a time in their lives when 
that understanding will have a meaningful impact. And as to 
cultivating the mother-child relationship, all of our science 
shows that nothing is more likely to foster positive bonding 
than frequent and prolonged periods of time together. Where 
it’s possible to structure parent-child interactions in the way 
                                                                                                 
3 The court pressed Ms. Felix on this issue, because it was concerned that the two-week 
leave periods were “illusory if you’re always being called back to the office.” Ms. Felix 
explained the scientific reasons why this kind of urgent need would be unlikely to arise, 
but why it would be catastrophic if it did and she could not personally report to the lab 
for mitigation. She explained that, to her, the strong encouragement of her employer 
meant that no negative consequences would result merely because she travelled, but 
that if she were to travel and something were to go wrong that could have been 
prevented by her quick intervention, it would cost her the job. The court credited her 
explanation and concluded that the limitation is reasonable and also not likely to 
interfere with the leave time that has been offered. For purposes of this appeal, it 
suffices to say that no one has challenged the district court’s conclusion. 
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Ms. Felix contemplates, our studies show there is no better 
recipe for a positive relationship.   
If the court had been ambivalent at that point, additional testimony from Mr. Sero 
pushed the court’s reasoning along. Mr. Sero testified that: 
I’m not a fool. I understand that this means she’ll expose our 
kids to opportunities that I could never give them. Even if the 
money wasn’t an issue, it’s a fact of my life that I’m not going 
to be able to spend weeks at a time with my kids or put them 
in private schools like these, or send them to Europe in the 
summer. 
¶ 20 The district court, stating that it was struggling with the difficulty of the decision 
at hand, presented Mr. Sero with a “compromise offer.” The court indicated that it 
could not ignore the benefits that the children would enjoy from their mother’s new 
arrangement, or the equity of now giving Ms. Felix the opportunity to build the kind of 
relationship with the children that Mr. Sero had been building for ten years. The court 
stated that, “after years of effort to build this better life for her children, it would be 
very unfortunate if the court gave so much weight to the status quo that it would not 
position the family to take advantage of the new benefits being made available or the 
chance for the children to build an even stronger relationship with their mother.” The 
court nevertheless expressed its reluctance to disrupt the current custody arrangement, 
which had “provided a positive and stable environment for the children.”   
¶ 21 The court then stated: “We could resolve this very easily if you would be willing 
to move to South Carolina and live a short distance from Ms. Felix and the children. 
Then all of these benefits would be made available, but you could also remain the 
primary custodian.” Mr. Sero responded by saying that there “is just no way I can leave 
my job, my family, my home, my friends, and the life I have built in Utah.” The district 
court then inquired “what if that’s the only way that it makes sense for you to retain 
custody of the children, is it something you could do?” Mr. Sero stated, “even then, 
your honor, I don’t know how I would make it work because it would be such a 
financial disruption and it would make it impossible for me to have relationships with 
people in Utah and, besides, I can’t imagine being in a position where, if she moves 
again, I’d have to pick up and move just to stay close to her and the kids.”  
The Decision Below 
¶ 22 In their arguments before the district court, the parties each presented the issues 
that are raised on appeal. Mr. Sero’s counsel argued that “the constitution requires the 
court to give some extra level of consideration to Mr. Sero’s choice not to relocate,” and 
that “there’s a fundamental right to interstate travel, and that includes the right to 
choose where to settle and find a job, or the right not to be compelled to resettle and 
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find a new job, at least not without a showing of compelling circumstances and narrow 
tailoring.” Counsel continued that “the other side of the coin is Mr. Sero’s constitutional 
interest in being a parent to his children, which is also infringed if the court takes that 
right away just because of his exercise of his constitutional rights regarding travel.”  
¶ 23 The district court rejected Mr. Sero’s arguments, concluding that “the 
constitutional right to travel does not require specialized consideration in child custody 
cases.” The court stated that the relevant statutes require consideration “of the 
children’s best interests, not the parents’ preferences regarding residence or 
relationships.” The court also stated that it was “ironic that Mr. Sero would cite a right 
to travel in support of his desire to stay in one place” and that it “[could] not conclude 
that a constitutional right to travel operates in the way Mr. Sero claims it should.” 
¶ 24 The district court found that the best interests of the children would be served by 
granting Ms. Felix sole physical custody. The court explained its decision as follows:  
Mr. Sero, I very reluctantly transition physical custody away 
from you and to Ms. Felix. The court is keenly aware of the 
powerful bond you have formed with your children and the 
high quality of care that you have provided for most of their 
lives. And absent profound changes in circumstances like 
those presented here, I imagine we’d be discussing a different 
outcome. 
But there is no denying just how substantially circumstances 
have changed. You yourself credited the unique 
opportunities being presented by Ms. Felix’s new situation.  
And the custody evaluator explained how positive the 
transition promises to be for your children.   
I’m also crediting the fact that your children are old enough 
to process the change, and that they told the custody 
evaluator that although they are anxious at the prospect of 
relocating, changing schools, and not being able to live 
primarily with you, they are also excited by the prospect of 
suddenly having much more time to spend with their mother 
and doing so in a new environment with new opportunities. 
This is the closest of calls, but on balance the court cannot 
ignore the benefits that will flow to your children by virtue of 
this new situation.  
¶ 25 The court modified the existing custody order to award sole physical custody to 
Ms. Felix. Citing “confidence arising from the parties’ ability to work well together in 
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the past,” the court directed the parties to work out a mutually acceptable plan for 
visitation that would “entitle Mr. Sero to at least as much time with the children as Ms. 
Felix had enjoyed under the old order.” 
¶ 26 With respect to the issue of unpaid childcare expenses, Mr. Sero argued that Ms. 
Felix should be barred by the doctrine of laches from attempting to recover payments 
after waiting nearly ten years to bring the issue to the court’s attention. Mr. Sero argued 
that he had been injured by Ms. Felix’s lack of diligence because, by waiting nearly ten 
years to do anything about the unpaid amounts, she had allowed the outstanding 
amount attributable to Mr. Sero to rise to nearly $24,000. If Ms. Felix had pursued the 
issue sooner, Mr. Sero argued, he could have invoked the court’s continuing jurisdiction 
over the child support order and sought a redistribution of the obligation based on the 
fact that Ms. Felix unilaterally elected to incur the expense. Ms. Felix argued that, where 
a statute of limitations has been enacted by the legislature, the statute of limitations 
should control, and equitable defenses should not be available.  
¶ 27 The district court, citing Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, 339 P.3d 131 
(referred to herein as Veysey I), and Veysey v. Nelson, 2017 UT App 77, 397 P.3d 846 
(referred to herein as Veysey II) reluctantly agreed with Mr. Sero. The court explained 
that, like Ms. Felix, the court believed the legislative intent that led to the adoption of 
the statute of limitations should control the time period for bringing a claim. But, the 
district court concluded, if the defense of laches was available—as this court’s precedent 
makes clear that it is—then Mr. Sero had met the elements for asserting laches as a 
defense. Noting Ms. Felix’s disagreement with the standard being applied, the court 
stated that she should “raise [her] concerns with the higher courts.”     
¶ 28 Both parties appealed. Mr. Sero claims the district court erred in awarding 
custody to Ms. Felix without giving due consideration to his constitutional right to 
travel. Ms. Felix claims that the Veysey cases were wrongly decided with respect to 
laches, and that laches should not have been a defense available to Mr. Sero in opposing 
her claims for unpaid childcare expenses. We reverse the district court’s opinion with 
respect to the constitutional issue, but reluctantly affirm with respect to the availability 
of the laches defense.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶ 29 It is true that the district court’s determination of what is in the best interests of 
children in a custody dispute is entitled to deference and overturned only if we 
determine that the district court abused its discretion. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 
(Utah 1988). But Mr. Sero does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in 
undertaking that difficult examination in this case; he argues that a unique legal 
standard applies when the district court undertakes that inquiry in the face of a 
potential infringement on a custodial parent’s rights to interstate travel. That raises the 
question of whether the district court applied the correct legal standard, which is a 
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question we review de novo, without deference to the district court. See Mawhinney v. 
City of Draper, 2014 UT 54, ¶ 6, 342 P.3d 262.   
¶ 30 The question of whether the defense of laches is available and the application of 
a statute of limitations is a legal question that we review for correctness. Veysey II, 2017 
UT App 77, ¶ 5, 397 P.3d 846; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ¶ 4, 979 P.2d 823. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. The Constitutional Right to Interstate Travel Requires 
Special Analysis in Certain Child Custody Cases 
¶ 31 We agree with Mr. Sero that the United States Constitution protects a 
fundamental right to travel, which includes the right to choose one’s state of residence, 
and that the district court erred by not giving due weight to Mr. Sero’s constitutional 
right.4 The constitutional right to travel is both “firmly embedded in [constitutional] 
jurisprudence,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999), and notoriously difficult to pin 
down. In different contexts, the United States Supreme Court has found support for the 
right in the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, the commerce 
clause, or some other implicit right that is “so elementary . . . [as] to be a necessary 
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969); see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–02 (privileges and immunities 
clause); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418–19 & n.13 (1981) (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 
U.S. 270, 274 (1900)) (due process clause); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758–59 
(1966) (commerce clause). We need not distill the source of the right any more clearly 
than has the United States Supreme Court. We take our direction from that Court’s 
pronouncement that “[a]lthough there have been recurring differences in emphasis 
within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is 
no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists.” 
Guest, 383 U.S. at 759.  
¶ 32 We also agree with Mr. Sero that the right includes the right to be free from state 
interference in choosing where to reside. A long line of cases has limited states’ ability 
to enact residency requirements that would inhibit an attempt by a citizen of one state 
to settle in a new state. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. And although those cases apply to 
citizens seeking to change their state of residence, we cannot fathom that the rule would 
not also protect a citizen seeking to be free from state interference in his desire to 
remain in his established state of residence. Where the Supreme Court has stated that “a 
citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any 
State he chooses, and to claim citizenship there[],” we take the Court at its word. Id. at 
503–04 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 48 (1872)).    
¶ 33 Applying the foregoing precedent, a number of state courts have enacted rules 
for analyzing the impact of a parent’s right to travel when analyzing custody 
                                                                                                 
4 We note that this issue was raised in a factually similar case, but was not resolved 
because it had not been preserved by the appellant in that case. Vanderzon v. 
Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶¶ 30–31, 402 P.3d 219. The conclusion of the court of 
appeals in that case, that the right was not so clearly established that the district court’s 
failure to account for it constituted plain error, does not impact our analysis in this case, 
where the issue is preserved. Id. ¶¶ 32–36. 
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determinations, or have concluded that their respective custody-determination statutes 
require consideration of the right. Fredman v. Fredman, 960 S.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007); In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 
N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991); 
Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624 (2000). We agree with Mr. Sero that the United States 
Constitution requires that the courts of Utah accommodate his fundamental right when 
making determinations regarding the custody of his children. The district court failed to 
do so. In fact, the district court appears to have required Mr. Sero to forfeit his right to 
travel, expressed through Mr. Sero’s choice regarding where to reside, in order to 
maintain custody of his children. This was error that requires reversal. 
¶ 34 Having concluded that the district court erred, we are compelled to offer some 
guidance regarding how to handle this inquiry on remand. As the parties have pointed 
out to us in their briefing, states take varying approaches to analyzing this issue. We 
here examine the various approaches and explain why we think the rule in Utah should 
be that the district court must weigh the parents’ rights to travel against the best 
interests of the children as a means of harmonizing competing constitutional concerns 
and the statutory standard for making custody determinations.  
¶ 35 We find the analysis of the Supreme Court of Colorado to be very helpful both in 
surveying the competing approaches to this issue and also in setting a workable rule.  
In In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 137–38, the mother and primary custodian of 
the couple’s child sought modification of the applicable parenting time order in order to 
allow her to relocate out of state with the parties’ child. The father opposed the change. 
Id. The district court in that case rejected the proposed change, which would have had 
the effect of forcing the mother not to relocate, or to undertake the move and forego the 
parenting time to which she was entitled under the plan. Id. at 138. The mother argued 
that the decision, and the way the competing interests were weighed, violated her 
constitutional right to travel. Id. 
¶ 36 The Colorado Supreme Court surveyed three different state approaches before 
settling on the rule that would apply in Colorado. First, the court noted that at least one 
state protects the parent’s right to travel above competing interests. The court described 
the “Wyoming Approach” as one where the “right to travel is absolute,” such that a 
parent seeking to modify a custody determination to prevent the custodial parent from 
moving out of state with the couple’s child could not rely on the changed circumstances 
resulting from the move as a basis for modifying the divorce decree. Id. at 143 (citing 
Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999)). The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the 
approach, concluding that it fails to adequately account for the rights of the non-
custodial parent and replaces the fact-driven inquiry into a child’s best interests with a 
presumption in favor of continuing custody for the relocating parent. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court has since overruled Watt. Arnott v. Arnott, 293 P.3d 440 (Wyo. 2012).  
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We reject the approach easily—in its attempt to honor the custodial parent’s right to 
travel, it disregards the competing right of the non-custodial parent.  
¶ 37 Second, the court noted that at least one state disregards the parent’s right to 
travel and focuses solely on the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 
P.3d at 143–45 (citing LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163–64). The court described the 
Minnesota approach as one where the best interests of the child are deemed to 
constitute a compelling state interest. Id. at 144. In light of constitutional jurisprudence 
that permits the subjugation of even fundamental rights in service of a compelling state 
interest, this approach reflects the determination that parental rights must always yield 
to what is in a child’s best interests. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to adopt 
this approach. Id. at 145. Its decision was based, in part, on unique features of 
Colorado’s custody determination statutes, but it also found persuasive the United 
States Supreme Court’s statement that “’in th[e] highly sensitive constitutional area’” of 
fundamental rights “’only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give 
occasion for permissible limitation.’” Id. at 144–45 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 406 (1963)). 
¶ 38 We find the Minnesota approach appealing in its simplicity, but this very case 
demonstrates how that rule also falls short of the necessary level of constitutional 
protection. Certainly, the Minnesota approach is easy to administer; the analysis 
requires no inquiry into the parent’s constitutional rights because the court’s 
determination of what is in the child’s best interests will always justify infringing the 
right to travel. There is some analytical appeal in the approach as well. In Utah, many 
facets of parental rights are fundamental, such that they can be overcome only upon a 
showing of a compelling state interest. Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26 & n.5, 359 P.3d 
603. By implication, then, whenever a custody determination limits one parent’s rights 
because of a best-interests determination, that determination must have reflected a 
compelling interest. 
¶ 39 But although we find the Minnesota approach superficially appealing, we 
ultimately conclude it is inadequate to balance very substantial constitutional concerns.  
For instance, if a court concludes that the best interests of the children are going to be 
served equally well by either custody determination, then the Minnesota approach 
would give as much weight to a coin toss as it would to the parents’ rights. There is no 
conceivable justification in that hypothetical situation for not analyzing whether one 
parent’s right to travel is weighty enough to tip the otherwise balanced scales. It follows 
that if, as in this case, the best-interests determination is the “closest of calls,” a showing 
by one parent of a particularly weighty interest in the right to travel may outweigh the 
marginal difference between how a child’s best interests will be served in competing 
custody situations. 
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¶ 40 That brings us to the third approach analyzed by the Colorado Supreme Court, 
which was articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Jaramillo. In re 
Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 145–47 (citing Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 307–09). That 
approach requires courts to balance “the majority time parent’s right to travel and the 
state’s concerns in protecting the best interests of the child, but also the minority 
parent’s right to maintain close association and frequent contact with the child.” Id. at 
146. The Ciesluk court quoted approvingly the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that shifting burdens and creating presumptions “does violence to both 
parents’ rights [and] jeopardizes the true goal of determining what in fact is in the 
child’s best interests.” Id. at 146 (quoting Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305). The better 
approach, the Ciesluk court concluded, requires that the district court undertake the 
“admittedly difficult task of determining, on the facts, how best to accommodate the 
interests of all parties before the court, both parents and children.” Id. (quoting 
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305). 
¶ 41 We find the New Mexico approach, which was adopted by the Colorado 
Supreme Court and has also been adopted in Maryland, to establish the appropriate 
standard. Id.; Braun, 750 A.2d 624. We are persuaded that this approach provides the 
appropriate means of accounting for competing constitutional interests, because it is the 
best mechanism for analyzing the rights of both parents to travel in the context of the 
best interests of the child.  
¶ 42 Notably, when undertaking this evaluation, the court may very well reach the 
same result it has already reached in this case. Although the constitutional right to 
travel was asserted by Mr. Sero, Ms. Felix also enjoys that right. Here, she seeks to 
exercise that right to take advantage of a new job opportunity in another state. It may be 
that, in light of all the facts and circumstances, exercise of the right by Ms. Felix is as 
important to her as Mr. Sero’s right to stay in Utah is to him. But there is a meaningful 
chance that it is not—after all, the job opportunities that catalyzed Ms. Felix’s decision 
to move were presented to her with little searching. Perhaps she is willing to keep 
looking for something closer to Mr. Sero. Perhaps she is simply not as tied to this job 
opportunity as Mr. Sero is tied to Utah. Or perhaps she even prefers to stay in Utah but 
is undertaking the change very reluctantly. The fact that these issues were not 
developed below is a symptom of the district court applying the wrong standard. 
Rather than analyze Mr. Sero’s and Ms. Felix’s constitutional rights to travel, the district 
court appears to have disregarded them. In fact, it seems to have suggested that Mr. 
Sero could retain custody only if he was willing to give up his right to travel. This 
constitutes error that requires remand and reconsideration of the various interests at 
hand, in a manner consistent with the test we have outlined here.   
II. While Veysey May Have Been Wrongly Decided, We Are 
Bound by Stare Decisis to Affirm  
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¶ 43 We are bound by precedent to affirm the district court’s decision that the 
doctrine of laches forecloses Ms. Felix’s claims for unpaid child support, even though 
such claims would not be foreclosed by the applicable statute of limitations.5 Our 
decision rests on application of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis.   
¶ 44 This court is “bound by [its own] previous decisions as well as the decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court.” State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, ¶ 9, 156 P.3d 854. The Utah 
Supreme Court has provided clear direction regarding both “vertical” stare decisis and 
“horizontal” stare decisis. With respect to the former, “[v]ertical stare decisis . . .  
compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.” Id. (quoting 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994)). With respect to the latter, 
horizontal stare decisis requires that “the first decision by a court on a particular 
question of law governs later decisions by the same court.” Id. (quoting State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). This court also has little latitude to overrule 
its own prior decisions. While the Utah Supreme Court may, in certain carefully 
measured circumstances, overrule its prior decisions, one panel of this court does not 
have the power to overrule another panel unless the earlier decision was “clearly 
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.” 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3. 
¶ 45 The precise question raised here—whether the defense of laches may be raised in 
a case where the claims asserted would not be barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations—was clearly presented to and decided by a panel of this court in Veysey I, 
2014 UT App at 264, ¶ 18. There, the court stated that, if facts supported application of 
the doctrine of laches “a determination that . . . claims are barred would not necessarily 
be inappropriate,” even where the statute of limitations would not bar the claims.6 Id. 
                                                                                                 
5 Perhaps because she is aware of the deference we would afford the district court, Ms. 
Felix does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings related to the laches issue, or 
the trial court’s conclusion that, in light of those facts, the elements necessary to sustain 
the laches defense have been met. Rather, Ms. Felix challenges the purely legal 
determination that laches is available as a defense in this case. 
6 We do pause at the court’s use of the phrase “not necessarily,” which might be read to 
suggest that there are at least some circumstances where laches should be unavailable. 
Veysey I, 2014 UT App at 264, ¶ 18. But if there was uncertainty about the breadth of 
that holding, it was resolved when the case was presented to the court again after 
remand. In Veysey I, this court rejected the application of the laches defense because it 
was not supported by adequate factual findings. Id. On remand, the district court made 
the contemplated factual findings. Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 14. When the 
availability of the laches defense was presented as an issue again in the appeal 
following remand, the court of appeals spoke with much more clarity, holding that 
“because laches may apply in situations where the statute of limitations has not yet run, 
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¶ 46 Notably, the facts in this case track quite closely the facts in the Veysey series of 
cases. As in this case, those cases involved a parent seeking recovery of child care 
expenses based on daycare costs having increased several years before the filing of a 
claim. Veysey I, 2014 UT App 264, ¶¶ 2–3. We can find no principled basis for applying 
a legal rule in this case that differs from the one announced by this court in the Veysey 
decisions. The issues are the same and the factual circumstances are closely analogous, 
so that the rule is being applied in precisely the manner contemplated in the Veysey 
decisions. We must affirm.   
¶ 47 Despite the foregoing, we have our doubts about the holding in Veysey II. The 
appellant in Veysey II raised a number of persuasive arguments against the availability 
of a laches defense. For instance, Utah Code section 78B-12-109 states that the defenses 
of waiver and estoppel are not available in certain actions for the payment of child 
support, a rule that applied in Veysey I due to the posture in that case. Id. ¶ 18 n.6. The 
appellant in Veysey I argued that that statute foreclosed application of the laches 
defense. Id. The court disagreed, recounting the legal distinction between estoppel and 
laches, and “decline[d] to read” estoppel and waiver “more broadly” to include 
“laches.” Id. Yet, is it not “the primary objective of statutory interpretation to ascertain 
the intent of the legislature?” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). We are not as persuaded as this court’s prior panel that the 
legislature intended the definition of estoppel to be so narrow that it would not include 
the doctrine of laches. See, e.g., 20C AmJur Pl. & Pr. Forms Quieting Title § 67 (referring 
to the doctrine as “Estoppel by laches”); 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 31:2 (5th ed.) (same).  
¶ 48 Relatedly, the appellant in Veysey II argued that the application of laches where 
the legislature has established a statute of limitations violates the separation of powers 
doctrine. Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 n.4. This court refused to relinquish its 
traditional equitable powers “absent an inescapable inference to the contrary.” Id. But if 
the meaning of Utah Code section 78b-12-109 is not as narrow as the court’s 
interpretation, it seems to us that that statute is the “inescapable inference” that gives 
rise to separation of powers concerns. 
¶ 49 Finally, the Veysey II court cites case law from the Utah Supreme Court in a way 
that suggests that it felt its conclusion was inescapable as a matter of precedent. Id. ¶ 7. 
While we see no basis for distinguishing this case from Veysey II, we certainly think the 
holding in the Veysey decisions is distinguishable from the cases upon which those 
decisions relied. For instance, the panel in Veysey II cites Insight Assets v. Farias, for the 
                                                                                                 
the existence of a statute of limitations does not . . . automatically preclude application 
of the laches doctrine.” Id. ¶ 7.  
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rule that “[t]he doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of 
limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been 
satisfied.” Veysey II, 2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 (quoting Insight Assets v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, 
¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1021). But that language from Insight Assets relates to the application of 
the purchase money rule in a mortgage foreclosure action, which the court points out 
are “equitable in nature and therefore subject to the equitable defense of laches.” Insight 
Assets, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 18. Veysey II also quotes Borland v. Chandler for the proposition 
that Utah has “abolished any formal distinction between law and equity.” Veysey II, 
2017 UT App 77, ¶ 7 (quoting Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987)). But 
Borland was decided in 1987 and yet, in 2013, the Utah Supreme Court referred to that 
very distinction in its decision in Insight Assets, leaving us unsure whether something 
beyond the “formal distinction” might still be at work in the interplay between 
equitable doctrines and statutory rules.   
¶ 50 Were we deciding this issue in the first instance today, free of the binding force 
of the Veysey decisions, we have some doubt about whether we would reach the same 
result. Those doubts are undoubtedly cold comfort to Ms. Felix. Perhaps by taking the 
time in this case to call attention to our own uncertainty, we will better position Ms. 
Felix or some future litigant to obtain review of this issue by the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 51 We affirm the district court’s decision that Ms. Felix’s claim for unpaid childcare 
expenses was barred by the doctrine of laches. But we reverse the district court’s order 
granting sole physical custody to Ms. Felix, on the basis that the court’s determination 
failed to account for Mr. Sero’s constitutional right to travel. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for additional proceedings consistent with the standard we have set forth 















Felix v. Sero 
20248791-CA  18  
____________________________________ 





Felix v. Sero 
20248791-CA  19  
 
Zane, J., (dissenting in part and concurring in part): 
¶ 53 I dissent with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s analysis 
of the custody matter was constitutionally infirm. I concur with the majority’s decision 
insofar as the majority holds that the doctrine of laches was available to Mr. Sero as a 
defense in this case. But I write separately because I do not share the majority’s doubts 
regarding whether Veysey was correctly decided. 
¶ 54 With respect to the constitutional question, I would affirm on the basis that the 
Minnesota approach, where the best interests of the children are the paramount 
consideration, is the better rule. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000). And because I believe that rule is, in effect, the rule applied by the district 
court in this case, I would affirm the district court’s judgment. In particular, I am 
persuaded that the best interests of the children is a compelling interest that is adequate 
to override the competing interests of the parents. Were that not the case, every custody 
determination would be constitutionally infirm because every custody determination 
would limit parental rights on some lesser showing, which the Utah Supreme Court 
instructs us is not allowed. See Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶ 26, 359 P.3d 603. 
¶ 55 Further, I cannot see how any court can weigh the value of one parent’s right to 
travel against the other parent’s right to travel. How is one parent’s right weightier than 
the other? Perhaps the court means that, on balance, one parent is less likely to be 
harmed by losing that right, but that seems to me to be poor justification for a 
constitutional infringement. I am persuaded that the best-interests determination that 
has long been the bellwether indicator of custody determinations is a sufficiently 
adequate means of advancing the state’s interest in protecting children in custody 
disputes that that determination, without more, is constitutionally adequate.  
¶ 56 Regarding Veysey, I believe the majority in this case strains to find hyper-
technical and artificially limited ways of parsing language from prior cases in order to 
sow doubt where none need exist. It is beyond dispute that the old distinctions between 
law and equity have been abolished. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 2). The fact that Utah courts might sometimes refer to the original 
nature of certain causes of action, as was the case in Insight Assets v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, 
¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1021, does not change the fact that the distinctions are no longer 
operative. 
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¶ 57 I think Veysey was rightly decided, but even if reasonable minds could differ 
with respect to that conclusion, I see no basis for broadcasting doubts about whether it 
should be followed, or taking the unusual step of urging the Utah Supreme Court to 




Charles S. Zane, Presiding Judge 
 
